California Decert/Recert Scorecard

New Requirements:

• Diebold - maximum of one TSx DRE per polling place; TSx ok for early voting with restrictions.
• Sequoia - maximum of one Edge DRE per polling place; Edge ok for early voting with restrictions.
• Hart - no new limits on eSlate DRE.
• AutoMARK - not reviewed, new version submitted to state for certification;
• Los Angeles: InkaVote+ certification rescinded due to not supplying Secretary of State required information, may be examined & recertified.
• Los Angeles: Central tabulator (MTS or Gems) - status unclear.
• Lots of new requirements for all vendors and counties, mainly in the security and auditing areas.

More details:

"The primary reason for taking this step is for clarity, ensuring that everything associated with a particular system is in one single recertification document that is easy for the public, elections officials, and others to follow and understand."

New conditions for Diebold and Sequoia DREs, but not Hart DREs:

• Jurisdictions may have at most one DRE per polling place for accessibility/HAVA, but must have at least five persons voluntarily cast their ballots on each to protect voter privacy.

  (Note: it says one per polling place, not one per precinct).

• DREs may be used in early voting with new restrictions: they must be staffed only by County elections employees, one employee there strictly to prevent unauthorized access, DREs must be locked up overnight in a County facility as secure as the County's election headquarters, must reseal security seals each night, etc.

  (Alameda County had early voting at 8 sites, e.g. Berkeley city hall, Livermore, etc. I doubt any of the above conditions were met. This may end most early voting, especially at satellite locations, in Diebold and Sequoia DRE Counties.)

• Jurisdictions must conduct a 100% manual count of all votes cast on the DREs in early voting and on election day.

• Training of poll workers must include "A voter's right to vote on a paper ballot (in all DRE polling places) and how to handle requests for paper ballots.

• Before Presidential Primary, all software/firmware must be reinstalled including operating systems and reformatting hard drives, using software obtained directly from federal testing lab or Secretary of State.
• Ban on any component have Internet connectivity, directly or indirectly, at any time. Ban on wireless and modem transmission with any component of voting system. No network connections to non-voting system devices.
• Public allowed to look at (but not touch) all externally visible security seals.
• Poll workers must print two copies of the accumulated vote results and audit logs for each device; each poll worker must sign all copies, one set posted outside and one set sent to Registrar.
• No-one allowed to record order or time of voters voting.
• Vendor must develop within 60 days plans for lots of stuff including identification of abnormal voting patterns on VVPAT and escalation of audit sampling for differences between electronic and manual audit vote results.
• Any post-election auditing requirements imposed as a condition of this certification shall be paid for by the vendor.
• Secretary of State will establish additional manual audit requirements including escalation in close races and desired confidence level. (Is this included in being paid for by vendor?) And Secretary will establish procedures to increase transparency and effectiveness of manual counts!
• Jurisdictions must use the "air-gap" model with separation of functions of servers for security.

• InkaVote+ - certification rescinded, may be examined & recertified. Materials submitted to late for current review**, but will be reviewed (at extra cost). If passes review, may be recertified with conditions for Feb. 5, 2008 election.
• MTS or Gems 2 for Los Angeles - ??? (Rumor has it MTS runs on Los Angeles County mainframe computers. If so, a red team test could expose flaws in the County systems, such as payroll, personnel, etc. and there is no way they would allow such a test.) Gems 2 is federally qualified, not state certified.

For full details:

* According to "County Voting Systems for the November 7, 2006 General Election", Orange, San Mateo, and Yolo use Hart exclusively, Humboldt, Lake, Madera, Sonoma use the Hart eSlate just for polling place accessibility.

** On March 26, 2007, Secretary Bowen gave Election Systems and Software (ES&S) written notice to provide InkaVote Plus materials within 30 days (as provided in the original Certification document for InkaVote Plus). Despite many further requests, ES&S did not provide the materials until June 26, 2007, too late to be included in the review which ran from May 31, 2007 to July 20, 2007.

By Jerry Berkman, Aug. 5, 2007