Alameda County's Voting System RFP
Jerry Berkman, May 17, 2006

Executive Summary

Any system bought for the November election may not be usable thereafter due to lawsuits, the new Voting System standard, changing laws, and changes in the Secretary of State office. Thus Alameda County should spend as little as possible, and avoid being locked in to one vendor.

Also, it would be prudent to wait until after the primary to see how the new systems fare in other California counties, and until after hiring the new Registrar.

Details

• California Elections Code - Accessibility
  The Diebold and Sequoia DREs do not have an accessible voter verified paper audit trail. The DREs may be accessible and may have paper trails, but do not have an accessible paper trail as required and defined by EC 19250 and 19251.
• Should Alameda County spend $17 Million just for the November Election?
  It is likely that any DRE based system Alameda County buys will have to be replaced or upgraded before any future elections:
  • The next Secretary of State may require adherence to the Elections Code, e.g. EC 19250 and 19251, which current DREs fail to do.
  • All DREs will be required to be certified according to the new 2005 Voting System Standards before the next (2008) federal elections.
  • AB 2097 would require full disclosure of source code; if this passes, Diebold will probably leave the state, as they did in North Carolina.
  • It may be too expensive to add IRV to the system.
• Security
  The Diebold system has major problems with security. It took a year to get Diebold to admit the memory card hack was a real vulnerability. Last week, Black Box Voting published a new, more dangerous set of vulnerabilities, with no known mitigations. One of these vulnerabilities first surfaced several years ago. Diebold has not fixed it, showing a lack of concern for security.
• The Secretary of State's Demands
  Has Secretary of State Bruce McPherson threatened legal action? If so, this is probably a bluff. Once in court, he would have to answer why he is asking Alameda County to buy a system which clearly violate the California Elections Code. I don't think he would want to be in that position. And any court case would probably take too long to be useful for him.
• Law Suits
  Alameda County is already being sued for considering buying Diebold equipment, by Voter Action. Alameda County would be dropped from the suit and possible consequences by not buying DREs.
• County Liability
  The certification documents issued by Secretary McPherson declare that the voting systems shall meet the requirements of state and federal law and standards. At no time, does he say they do meet the requirements. Further, item 4.j. states HAVA money can only be used on systems which shall meet the requirements. These systems do not meet the requirements, and McPherson has not claimed they do. What is Alameda County's liability if it buys one of these non-compliant system with HAVA funds?
• Non-Computerized BMDs
  No serious consideration has been made of buying non-computerized Ballot Marking Devices, such as Vote-PAD or EqualiVote. These are not subject to many of the problems outlined above.
• The Consultant's Report
  The Consultant's "Analysis of Options" Report contained many inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and misleading statements.

The Consultant's "Analysis of Options" Report

• Cost Analysis - 1
  The report lumps purchase, maintenance, and license costs together and then compares them to the available HAVA funding. But HAVA funds can only be used for purchasing systems, not for ongoing maintenance or licenses.
• Cost Analysis - 2
  The report does not compare the cost of storage, drayage, battery charging, etc., for the different systems.
• Accessibility
  The report does not compare accessibility of the systems.
• IRV
  The report does not compares how much more it would cost the county to upgrade to include IRV (Instant Runoff Voting) with the various vendors.
• False Touch Screen vs. BMD distinction
  The report uses the terms "touchscreens" and "BMDs" (Ballot Marking Devices) to differntiate types of systems. However, this is false, as the AutoMark is a touchscreen BMD.
• False BMDs not certified claims
  The report often mentions the BMDs are not yet certified. The ES&S AutoMark and OS were certified over a year ago. The Vote-PAD and EqualiVote have not been certified, but this should be easy as federal qualification is only required for DREs.
• Jan. 1, 2007
  The report repeats false claims about Jan., 2007, without identifying a source or law section.
• AVVPAT
  The report states three times that California Elections Code Sections 19350-19252[sic] require a voter verifiable paper receipt printers on each Touch Screen voting terminal. Sections 19250-19252 actually require "an accessible voter verified paper audit trail". The report omits the fact that the paper audit trail must be accessible, that EC 19252 defines accessible, and that the Diebold and Sequoia DRE paper trails don't meet the requirement!